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1. Introduction 
The main objective of this paper is to draw an explicit link between the literature on 
growth transitions and the balance-of-payments-constrained (BPC) growth model, as 
originally developed by Thirlwall (1979). Pritchett’s (2000) influential study shows that, in 
contrast to industrialised and East Asian countries, most developing economies exhibit shifts 
in growth rates that lead to distinct patterns, and that these patterns remain unexplained in 
cross-country and panel growth regressions. Motivated by Pritchett and earlier work by 
Easterly et al. (1993), several recent studies, such as Hausmann et al. (2005), Jerzmanowski, 
(2006), Jones and Olken (2008), and Kerekes (2012) have attempted to identify the key 
determinants of growth transitions. A common finding of these studies is that there is a 
distinct difference between factors that initiate growth transitions and those that sustain them. 
Growth accelerations of 3.5% per annum sustained for at least 8 years are a common feature 
of most developing economies (Hausmann et al., 2005). However, most of these growth 
accelerations tend to fizzle out and do not match the long-run growth transitions sustained 
over many decades in several Asian economies.   
How do the recent criticisms of Thirlwall’s (1979) original BPC growth model hold up 
when they are evaluated against the literature on growth transitions? A critique of the BPC 
model is that it excludes the level of the real exchange rate as a determinant of long-run 
growth, and that exports are primarily constrained from the supply side rather than world 
demand, as predicted by ‘Thirlwall’s law’ (Razmi, 2016; Blecker, 2016).  
Razmi (2016) provides an empirical test of Thirlwall’s law vis-à-vis his own alternative 
model for a sample of 167 countries over the period 1950-2011. Thirlwall’s law predicts that 
there should be a strong positive correlation between domestic income growth and world 
income growth. The evidence obtained from Razmi’s (2016) generalised method of moments 
(GMM) panel data estimates indicates that world income growth is a statistically insignificant 
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determinant of output growth, whereas the growth rate of physical capital accumulation is 
positive and significant. As far as the exchange rate is concerned, both the level of the real 
exchange rate (proxied by an undervaluation index) and the growth rate of the real terms of 
trade are statistically significant and contain theory-consistent signs. Overall, the GMM 
estimates seem to support Razmi’s (2016) alternative model, in which foreign demand is 
infinitely elastic and export growth responds to physical capital accumulation through a one-
off change in the level of the real exchange rate.  
How compatible is Razmi’s (2016) empirical evidence with the existing literature on 
growth transitions mentioned above? The unstable and unpredictable nature of growth 
patterns in developing countries suggest that panel data estimates are only suggestive of what 
determines long-run growth. In fact, the results obtained from Razmi’s panel data estimates 
do not necessarily disprove the relevance of Thirlwall’s law. Favourable real terms of trade 
shocks, an undervalued real exchange rate and a faster rate of physical capital accumulation 
would generate unsustainable growth transitions if an economy’s long-run growth rate is 
ultimately determined by Thirlwall’s law (x/). All these variables might be significant 
determinants of growth in a regression model that averages growth into a single regime, but 
because conventional panel data regressions do not distinguish between variables that initiate 
and sustain a growth transition, the regression results are uninformative about the long-run 
determinants of growth. This is precisely the message of the literature on growth transitions 
(Pritchett, 2000; Hausmann et al., 2005), and consistent with empirical evidence which shows 
that exchange rate-induced surges in output growth, investment and exports eventually fizzle 
out (Hausmann et al., 2005; Berg et al., 2012; Freund and Pierola, 2012; Libman et al., 2019). 
Something else is required to sustain growth (Rodrik, 2005, 2006, 2018).  
A rigorous test of Thirlwall’s law would therefore require a more in-depth and detailed 
analysis of turning points in a typical developing country’s growth performance, and whether 
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growth transitions are unsustainable because they are initiated through forces that fall outside 
the domain of the simple growth rule. To illustrate these arguments empirically, this paper re-
examines the relevance of Thirlwall’s law in South Africa over the period 1960-2017. The 
country-specific application in this paper provides an interesting comparison with Razmi 
(2016) who, in addition to his panel data estimates, also presents time-series estimates for a 
handful of individual countries over the period 1950-2011, including South Africa. Razmi’s 
(2016) regression results for South Africa are broadly consistent with the panel data evidence 
insofar as the exchange rate variables are statistically significant, and the magnitude of the 
physical capital accumulation coefficient is much larger than the estimate on world income.  
The results in this paper show that it is misleading to evaluate Thirlwall’s growth law 
across a single regime in South Africa. Although Thirlwall’s growth law under-predicts 
South Africa’s actual growth performance over the full sample period 1960-2017, it provides 
some explanation why growth spurts have historically been volatile and unsustainable. The 
original growth law accurately predicts South Africa’s actual growth performance over the 
period 1977-2003. Outside this regime, the economy has relied heavily on capital inflows to 
lift the balance-of-payments constraint on demand growth. Although long-term capital 
inflows were a characteristic feature over the period 1960-1976 of faster output growth, 
inflows during the period 2004-2017 were more volatile and short-term in nature. In fact, the 
evidence in this paper shows that the economy’s actual growth rate is converging back to the 
predicted rate of the BPC growth model during 2004-2017. Moreover, surges in physical 
capital accumulation and output growth have generally coincided with foreign capital inflows 
and a deteriorating current account deficit ratio, rather than improved export performance. 
Although a competitive exchange rate could well play an important role to initiate a growth 
transition in South Africa, the relevance of Thirlwall’s law suggests that growth will 
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eventually fizzle out if it is not complemented with trade and industrial policies that improve 
the structural demand characteristics of export goods in foreign markets.  
 
2. The Sustainability of Growth Transitions   
The focus of this paper is on Thirlwall’s (1979) original growth law and whether it 
remains relevant in the context of a typical developing country with multiple growth regimes. 
Several studies have analysed the importance of structural change and how it affects the 
predictive ability of the BPC growth model (see e.g., Cimoli et al., 2010; Tharnpanich and 
McCombie, 2013; Nell, 2013; Bagnai et al., 2016). The underlying hypothesis in this paper is 
that long-run growth in a developing economy is pinned down by the simple version of the 
law. The long-run growth rate, however, is not always directly observable when growth shifts 
are triggered by real terms of trade shocks and capital flows that may be unsustainable over 
the long run.  
As a basic reference point, it is useful to begin with the extended BPC growth model of 
Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) that includes capital inflows and real terms of trade effects. 
Since the full derivation of the model is well known, we only report the final equation of the 
extended version: 
 *** (1 ( ) )( ) ( ) ( )
CE E
dt ft t t t dtR R RSA
p p e z c p
y
  

      
                         (1) 
where ***SAy  is the BPC growth rate of South Africa;   (< 0) and   (< 0) are the price 
elasticities of demand for exports and imports, respectively; dtp is the growth rate of the 
domestic price of exports at time t; te  is the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate 
measured in units of domestic currency per foreign currency ( 0te  denotes a depreciating 
exchange rate); ftp  is the growth rate of the foreign price of imports;   (> 0) is the income 
elasticity of demand for exports; tz is world income growth; t dtc p  is the growth rate of real 
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capital inflows, assuming that the economy is in an initial current account deficit position; 
E/R and C/R are the proportions of the import bill financed by export earnings and net capital 
inflows, respectively; and   (> 0) is the income elasticity of demand for imports.  
The BPC growth literature often assumes that the real terms of trade (or real exchange 
rate) cannot continuously depreciate or appreciate (Thirlwall, 2011). It is therefore plausible 
to assume that in the long-run the rate of change of the real terms of trade is zero 
( 0dt ft tp p e   )
1. It is further assumed that a deteriorating current account deficit reflects a 
growing foreign debt burden. Since an economy cannot borrow indefinitely in foreign 
markets, the long-run restrictions E/R = 1 and C/R = 0 apply to equation (1). With these 
restrictions imposed, equation (1) gives the original BPC growth model developed by 
Thirlwall (1979): 
   *SA t
x
y

                                                             (2) 
Perraton (2003) dubs equation (2) the ‘weak’ version of Thirlwall’s law because an 
empirical fit of the model does not explicitly support the assumption that the growth rate of 
the real terms of trade is zero; it could still be contained in the growth rate of real exports, tx . 
Hence, the ‘strong’ version of the law is specified as follows: 
*SA tzy


                                                               (2) 
Equations (1)-(2) can be used to explain why growth transitions in developing countries 
are typically volatile and unsustainable. An investment-led strategy may generate faster 
growth over a period of time, but if it does not change the structural parameters of equation 
                                                 
1 Blecker (2016), in his critical review of the theoretical and empirical literature, argues in favour of this 
proposition of BPC growth models. 
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(2) in a favourable way, the current account deficit in equation (1) will deteriorate over time 
and lead to a slowdown in income growth to preserve equilibrium on the current account.  
It is useful to pause for a moment and go back to Razmi’s (2016) panel data evidence. 
Consistent with Razmi’s (2016) evidence, the growth rate of the physical capital stock may 
well be a significant determinant of income growth over a specific sample period. The key 
question, however, is whether faster growth in the capital stock generates a deteriorating 
current account deficit over time, or whether, consistent with Razmi’s (2016) model, it raises 
export growth from the supply side to preserve current account equilibrium. Libman et al. 
(2019) examine investment surges over 8-year windows and show that the trade balance 
(export minus imports) to GDP ratio typically becomes negative during the acceleration 
period, and eventually recovers to its original level of around zero after a decade. However, 
the net effect on income growth is unclear, because the recovery is partly due to a rise in 
exports and a fall in imports. The decrease in imports implies a slowdown in income growth. 
Moreover, long-run equilibrium on the trade balance would require a surplus in the post-
acceleration phase, which may entail a further slowdown in income growth to curtail imports.  
Real terms of trade shocks in equation (1) is another source of instability in a country’s 
growth performance (Easterly et al., 1993). More recently, growth accelerations in many sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) countries since 2000 have been attributed to favourable terms of trade 
shocks, rather than growth-inducing structural change and rapid industrialisation (McMillan 
et al., 2014; de Vries et al., 2015; Bagnai et al., 2016; Diao et al., 2017; Rodrik, 2018). 
However, history tells us that primary commodity booms tend to fizzle out and that sustained 
growth transitions are usually accompanied by rapid industrialisation (Bagnai et al., 2016; 
Rodrik, 2018).  
Relating these insights to the BPC growth model, it can be seen from equation (1) that a 
positive terms of trade shock ( 0dt ft tp p e   ) will initiate a growth transition, 
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assuming 1E
R
   . Because the terms of trade cannot rise forever, long-run growth is 
determined by world income growth and the relative income elasticities in equation (2). 
Again, a statistically significant real terms of trade effect in growth regressions (Razmi, 
2016) may simply pick up unsustainable growth transitions. 
One of the main criticisms that have been levelled against the simple version of the BPC 
growth model in equation (2) is that it omits any level effect of the real exchange rate on 
growth. Razmi (2016) and Blecker (2016) point out that this specification is inconsistent with 
existing empirical studies, most notably Rodrik (2008a), which show that an undervalued real 
exchange rate impacts positively on long-run growth (also see Rapetti et al., 2012). Razmi’s 
(2016) model assumes, in contrast to equation (2), that export demand is infinitely elastic in 
world markets, so that export growth is boosted from the supply side through a faster rate of 
capital accumulation induced by an undervalued real exchange rate. Missio et al. (2017), on 
the other hand, develop a model in which the income elasticities of demand for exports and 
imports in equation (2) are endogenous to movements in the level of the real exchange rate. 
In their model, an undervalued real exchange rate lifts the balance-of-payments constraint on 
growth.     
It is important to acknowledge, however, that Rodrik (2005, 2006, 2018) identifies the 
real exchange rate as a key initiating source of growth, while institutional reforms, 
investment in education and complementary industrial policies that ensure an ongoing 
process of diversification into new tradables are required to sustain growth in the long-run. 
Rapetti (2013), on the other hand, emphasises the importance of supportive demand and wage 
management policies to ensure that the growth-inducing effect of an exchange rate 
deprecation is sustained, while the model of Razmi et al. (2012) outlines additional 
prerequisites.   
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The fact that growth accelerations in many developing countries have eventually petered 
out suggests that the conditions necessary to sustain growth are absent, which brings us back 
to the long-run growth prediction of the simple version of the BPC growth model in equation 
(2). It is, therefore, a misnomer to regard econometric evidence of a statistically significant 
link between output growth and the real exchange rate as evidence against the long-run 
growth prediction of the BPC model. As the experience of East Asian countries and China 
suggests, complementary industrial and trade policies may well be required to raise the 
income elasticity of demand for exports and reduce the income elasticity of demand for 
imports in equation (2) (Gouvea and Lima, 2010; Bresser-Pereira and Rugitsky, 2018).   
Another criticism against the BPC growth literature relates to the near-identity argument 
implied by the weak and strong versions of the law in equations (2) and (2) (see Razmi, 
2016; Blecker, 2016). To illustrate the near-identity argument, consider the import demand 
function with zero growth in the real terms of trade: 
SA
t tm y                                                                (3) 
where tm  is the growth rate of the volume of imports at time t;   is the income elasticity of 
demand for imports; and SAty  is South Africa’s domestic income growth rate. Substituting (3) 
into equation (2) gives: 
*SA
t
SA
tt
xy
y m
                                                                (4) 
Equation (4) shows that a statistical test of whether the actual growth rate is equal to the BPC 
growth rate ( *SA SAty y ) in equation (2) is equivalent to testing whether t tx m . It follows 
that empirical evidence in favour of equation (4) does not unambiguously support the causal 
mechanism that underlies Thirlwall’s BPC growth law, which states that domestic income 
growth is exogenously determined by world demand. Razmi’s model (2016), in which export 
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demand is infinitely elastic in world markets, also predicts that exports and imports grow at 
the same rate in the long run. 
To distinguish Thirlwall’s growth law from alternative models, it is necessary to show 
that world income growth is a significant determinant of domestic income growth, as implied 
by equation (2). In this context, it is instructive to follow the generalised version of the 
balance-of-payments model developed by Nell (2003) and specify South Africa’s BPC 
growth rate as a function of world income growth disaggregated according to its different 
(potential) trading partners:        
* OECD RSADC
1 2
SA
t ty y y                                                      (5) 
where OECDty  is the real income growth rate of countries belonging to the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) at time t; RSADCty is the real income growth 
rate of the rest of the Southern African Development Community (RSADC); and 1  (> 0) and 
2  (> 0) are reduced form parameters.  
If, in a regression analysis, OECD growth and/or RSADC growth are significant 
determinants of South Africa’s growth rate in equation (5), it will show that the demand for 
exports is not infinitely elastic in foreign markets but constrained by world income growth. 
Although the focus in this paper is on the empirical relevance of the simple version of the 
BPC growth law in equation (2), the fitted results of the generalised model in Nell (2003) are 
useful to complement the main findings. 
 
3. The Relevance of the BPC Growth Model in South Africa: some descriptive evidence 
The discussion thus far has stressed that an empirical test of the BPC growth model 
across a single regime may lead to misleading inferences if an economy’s actual growth 
performance is characterised by multiple regimes. Accordingly, this paper draws on Nell and 
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De Mello (2019), who use the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) procedure to identify structural 
break points endogenously in South Africa’s historical growth performance. Four potential 
breakpoints are identified: 1976, 1985, 1994 and 2003, where the break dates represent the 
last date of the previous growth regime. Nell and De Mello (2019: p. 274) further argue that 
1985 and 1994 do not represent ‘real’ turning points in South Africa’s long-run growth 
performance. Following the economic sanctions and debt moratorium imposed by Western 
nations in 1985, South Africa grew at a negative rate of 1.22% per annum (in per capita 
terms) over the period 1985-1993. The democratic elections in 1994 and South Africa’s re-
admission into the global economy led to a ‘growth revival’ from 1994 until 2003. Faster 
growth over the period 1994-2003, however, was more indicative of a recovery phase after 
the recessionary conditions that prevailed during the period 1985-1993, rather than a long-run 
growth transition. 
Figure 1 plots the natural logarithm (ln) of South Africa’s real gross domestic product 
(GDP) series over the period 1960-2017, together with a sub-division of the growth regimes 
1960-1976, 1977-2003 and 2004-2017 identified above. All the data in this paper are annual 
and sourced from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). Although data on real GDP are 
available from 1946 onwards, the real terms of trade series only starts in 1960, which restricts 
the sample period from 1960 until 2017. 
Table 1 reports the average growth rates across regimes in Figure 1, together with the 
current account to GDP ratio, the growth rate of the real terms of trade (the price of exports 
relative to the price of imports in domestic currency, excluding gold), and the growth rates of 
real imports and exports of goods and services. To evaluate the sustainability of South 
Africa’s improved growth performance during 2004-2017 in a later section, Table 1 also 
includes an additional regime over the period 2008-2017. 
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Figure 1. South Africa’s different growth regimes, 1960-2017 
 
Notes: (1) The fitted time trends are obtained by regressing (ln) real GDP on an intercept term and a time trend. 
The slopes of the fitted time trends proxy the average growth rates reported in the Figure, which are calculated 
as log differences. For example, the average growth rate over the period 1960-1976 is calculated as [(ln) real 
GDP1976  (ln) real GDP1959]/17. (2) The average growth rate over the period 1977-2003 excludes the years 1980 
and 1981, when a surge in the price of gold generated rapid (outlying) growth (Nell and De Mello, 2019). The 
average growth rate over the period 2004-2017 excludes outlying growth of 1.55% in 2009, following the 
global financial crisis in 2008. (3) Data source: SARB (see Appendix A).  
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics across Different Growth Regimes  
Growth 
regime 
Average 
real GDP 
growth 
(%) 
 
Average 
growth of 
imports       
(%) 
Average 
growth of 
exports        
(%) 
Average 
current 
account ratio 
(%) 
Average 
growth of real 
terms of trade 
(%) 
1960 – 1976 4.63  5.17 2.79 1.95 1.44 
1977 – 2003 1.74  2.44 2.85 0.62 0.69 
2004 – 2017 3.01  6.62 3.84 3.90 1.91 
2008 – 2017 2.10  3.96 2.69 3.88 1.64 
 
Notes: (1) The growth rates of the variables are calculated as log differences. (2) All the average growth rates 
(except the real terms of trade) during 2004-2017 and 2008-2017 exclude outlying (negative) growth in 2009, 
following the global financial crisis in 2008. (3) Data source: SARB (see Appendix A). 
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Table 1 shows that South Africa’s average real GDP growth rate of 4.63% during its 
fastest-growing regime (FGR) (1960-1976) coincides with an average current account deficit 
ratio of 1.95%, an excess of import growth over export growth of 2.38 percentage points, 
and negative growth in the real terms of trade of 1.44%. From these summary statistics, it 
can be inferred that the extended version of the BPC growth model in equation (1) may be 
more relevant in this regime than the simple version in equations (2)-(2), because the former 
incorporates the growth-inducing effects of real terms of trade movements and capital 
inflows. 
The growth narrative in Nell and De Mello (2019) suggests that long-term capital inflows 
in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) played a key role in financing the current 
account deficit ratio in the post-World War II period until 1976. However, this regime came 
to an end when the Soweto uprising in 1976 triggered a disinvestment campaign by foreign 
investors and long-term capital flight. 
The period 1977-2003 represents South Africa’s slowest growing regime (SGR), with an 
average real GDP growth rate of 1.74% (excluding outlying growth in 1980-1981, as 
explained in the note of Figure 1). In contrast to South Africa’s FGR, Table 1 shows that the 
current account ratio, real terms of trade growth and excess of import growth over exports 
growth are all ‘close’ to zero during the SGR. The descriptive statistics in Table 1, therefore, 
suggest that Thirlwall’s original growth law in equations (2)-(2) could be the relevant model 
during the SGR regime.   
Looking at the last regime over the period 2004-2017, Figure 1 and Table 1 show that 
South Africa’s growth performance improved relative to the SGR, with an average real GDP 
growth rate of 3.01% per annum (excluding outlying growth of 1.55% in 2009, following 
the global financial crisis in 2008). Table 1 indicates that the improvement in South Africa’s 
growth performance during 2004-2017 relative to the SGR coincides with a large current 
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account deficit ratio of 3.90%, an excess of import growth over export growth of 2.78 
percentage points, and positive growth of 1.91% in the real terms of trade. In contrast to 
South Africa’s FGR, the current account deficit ratio during this regime was primarily 
financed through short-term capital inflows, such as of portfolio investment and ‘other’ 
inflows, rather than long-term FDI (Rangasamy, 2014; Nell and De Mello, 2019). The 
descriptive statistics suggest that the extended BPC growth model in equation (1) may again 
become more relevant during this regime.  
From the evidence in Table 1, it is apparent that the simple version of the BPC growth 
model may not accurately predict the average growth rate in each regime, other than the 
period 1977-2003. Nevertheless, the main message of this paper is that the relevance of 
Thirlwall’s original law should not only be evaluated in terms of its empirical fit, but also 
whether growth transitions initiated through capital inflows and/or real terms of trade 
movements are sustainable. To complement the descriptive evidence in Table 1, the focus in 
the next sections is on an empirical fit of Thirlwall’s original growth law in equation (2), as 
well as a more detailed analysis on the sustainability of South Africa’s growth transitions 
over the period 1960-2017.   
 
4. Import Demand Function 
An empirical fit of Thirlwall’s growth law in equation (2) requires an accurate estimate of 
the income elasticity of demand for imports in the following log-level import demand 
specification: 
0ln( ) ln( ) ln( )t t t tM MRP Y                                           (6) 
where tM  is South Africa’s real imports of goods and services at time t; 0  is an intercept 
term; tMRP  is the price of imports relative to the price of exports (excluding gold) measured 
in South African rand; tY  is aggregate real GDP, which represents domestic income; and t  
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is an error term. Consistent with equation (1), it is hypothesised that the price elasticity of 
demand for imports is negative ( 0  ) and the income elasticity positive ( 0  ). Appendix 
A provides a detailed description of all the variables and data sources. 
To estimate the traditional import demand function in equation (6), this study employs the 
auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds-testing procedure of Pesaran et al. (2001). 
The solved long-run solution of the parsimonious ARDL model (2, 0, 2) over the period 
1960-2017 is given by (t-statistics in parentheses):2 
( 4.82) (21.10)
ˆln( ) 1.00 ln( ) 1.67 ln( )t t t tM MRP Y 

                                       (7) 
where tˆ  is the equilibrium error-correction term. The F-statistic (5.37) of the bounds-testing 
procedure exceeds the I(1) critical value of 4.85, so the null hypothesis of no long-run 
relationship can be rejected at the 5% significance level.3  
The relative price and income elasticities in equation (7) contain theory-consistent signs 
and are significant at the 1% significance level. A comparison with other import demand 
studies for South Africa shows that the magnitudes of the elasticity estimates in equation (7) 
are almost identical to those reported in Narayan and Narayan (2010) over the period 1960-
2005, and comparable with the estimates in Arize and Nippani (2010) over the sample period 
1973-20054.   
The error-correction model representation of the underlying ARDL specification over the 
period 1960-2017 is reported below (t-statistics in parentheses and p-values in curly 
brackets): 
                                                 
2 The Schwarz (1978) Bayesian (SB) criterion is used to select the parsimonious specification from a general 
unrestricted ARDL model of order three.  
3 Due to a word count restriction, we do not report all the details of the bounds-testing procedure. These results 
are available on request. 
4 Narayan and Narayan (2010) report relative price and income elasticities of 1.00 and 1.65, respectively. 
These estimates are comparable with Arize and Nippani’s (2010) relative price elasticity of 0.78 and income 
elasticity of 1.85.   
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1 1
( 4.46) (3.19) ( 2.71) (18.03) ( 2.91)
1
(3.32) (5.69) ( 4.39)
ln( ) 3.37 0.24 ln( ) 0.36 ln( ) 4.78 ln( ) 1.26 ln( )
ˆ0.09 0.14 0.21
t t t t t
t t t
M M MRP Y Y
D Dcom 
 
  


          
  
            (8)                 
Adjusted R2 = 0.87 
LM-test (serial correlation): F[2,45] =1.41{0.25}      standard error [ˆ ]  = 0.03 
Functional form: F[1,46] = 0.21{0.64}                       ARCH-test: F[2,45]= 0.30{0.74} 
Normality: 2 [2] = 0.03{0.98}                                   Chow-test: F[26, 11] = 0.84 {0.66} 
Heteroscedasticity: F[1,53] = 2.62{0.11}                   (sample split in 1991) 
 
LM is the Lagrange multiplier test for second-order serial correlation, ARCH is a test for 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997). The dummy 
variables tD  and tDcom  are defined in Appendix A. The error-correction model fits the data 
well (adjusted R2 = 0.87), passes the required diagnostic tests, and all the variables are 
statistically significant at the 1% level5. The estimate on the error-correction term ( 1tˆ  ) 
shows that 21% of any disequilibrium between actual and equilibrium import demand is 
being made up during the course of a year. 
The cointegration and diagnostic tests suggest that South Africa’s import demand 
function is well specified over the period 1960-2017. This contention is further supported by 
a wide range of stability tests, which show that the error-correction model is constant and 
structurally stable (not reported here, but available on request).  
 
5. Fitting the BPC Growth Model  
Table 2 fits the simple version of the BPCG model in equation (2) over the full sample 
period 1960-2017 and across the different regimes identified in Table 1. The long-run income 
elasticity of demand for imports ( ˆ =1.67) in equation (7) is used to fit the BPC growth 
model in column (2). McCombie’s (1989) test is applied to assess whether the difference 
                                                 
5 The null hypotheses of the diagnostic tests are the following: no residual serial correlation; no functional form 
misspecification; homoscedasticity; normal errors; no ARCH effects; and structural stability (Chow-test) based 
on a sample split in 1991. The error-correction model passes all the diagnostic tests at conventional significance 
levels. 
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between the actual and predicted growth rate in column (3) is statistically significant. The test 
requires the calculation of an implied income elasticity of demand for imports,   , which is 
the hypothetical elasticity that would make the actual growth rate equal to the predicted 
growth rate. Under the null hypothesis, the implied elasticity is equal to the estimated 
elasticity: ˆ( 1.67)    . If the null is not rejected based on a Wald test, then the actual and 
predicted growth rates are not statistically different from each other. Table 3 reports the 
results of McCombie’s test (1989) across the different growth regimes. 
 
Table 2. Fitting the BPC Growth Model Across Different Regimes 
 
Growth 
regime 
(1) 
Actual 
average 
growth rate 
(%) 
 
( )SAty  
(2) 
Predicted                   
average 
growth rate 
(%) 
 
* ˆ( / )SA ty x   
 
(3) 
 
Difference: (1)-(2) 
 
 
(4) 
Average 
growth of 
exports 
(%) 
 
( )tx  
(5) 
Income 
elasticity of 
demand for 
imports 
 
ˆ( )  
1960 - 2017 3.03 1.83 1.20 3.06 1.67 
1960 - 1976 4.63 1.67 2.96 2.79 1.67 
1977 - 2003 1.74 1.70 0.04 2.85 1.67 
2004 - 2017 3.01 2.30 0.71 3.84 1.67 
2008 - 2017 2.10 1.61 0.49 2.69 1.67 
 
 
 
Table 3. McCombie’s (1989) Test  
 
 
Growth regime  
Estimated income 
elasticity of 
imports ˆ( )  
Hypothetical 
income elasticity of 
imports ( )   
 
Wald test 
(
2 (1) ) 
 
Wald test 
(p-value) 
1960 - 2017 1.67 1.00 71.74 0.00 
1960 - 1976 1.67 0.60 182.88 0.00 
1977 - 2003 1.67 1.64 0.14 0.70 
2004 - 2017 1.67 1.27 25.59 0.00 
2008 - 2017 1.67 1.28 24.33 0.00 
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Consider the predictive ability of the BPC growth model over the full sample period from 
1960 to 2017 in Table 2. The difference between the actual and predicted growth rate of 1.2 
percentage points in column (3) is statistically significant at the 1% level based on 
McCombie’s test (1989) in Table 3. Thus, the BPC growth model under predicts over the 
period 1960-2017. 
What happens when the sample period is split into different regimes? In South Africa’s 
FGR over the period 1960-1976, the difference between the actual and predicted growth rate 
of 2.96 percentage points in column (3) of Table 2 is statistically significant in Table 3. The 
under-prediction of the BPC growth model during this regime may partly be attributed to 
capital inflows. Recall from Table 1 that South Africa’s average real GDP growth rate of 
4.63% from 1960 to 1976 coincides with an average current account deficit ratio of 1.95%. 
During this regime, the South African economy benefited from substantial long-term capital 
inflows (FDI), which financed faster import growth of 5.17% relative to export growth of 
2.79% (see Nell and De Mello, 2019). Table 1 further shows that the real terms of trade (the 
price of exports relative to the price of imports) grew at a negative rate of 1.44% over the 
period 1960-1976, thus refuting the zero restriction imposed by the simple version of the 
BPC growth model in equation (2). However, without knowing the magnitudes of the price 
elasticities in the extended BPC model (equation (1)) a priori, the growth effect of the real 
terms of trade is indeterminate. 
In South Africa’s SGR (1977-2003), the difference between the actual and predicted 
growth rate is only 0.04 percentage points in column (3) of Table 2. In this case, McCombie’s 
(1989) test in Table 3 cannot reject the null at any conventional significance level. Thus, in 
the SGR, the simple version of the BPC growth model accurately predicts South Africa’s 
growth rate. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 support this proposition. Recall that the 
average growth rates of imports and exports closely match each other at 2.44% cent and 
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2.85%, respectively, while the current account ratio is ‘close’ to its equilibrium value of zero 
at 0.62%. Moreover, the growth rate of the real terms of trade (0.69%) is less pronounced in 
the SGR relative to the other regimes.  
To counter the criticism that Thirlwall’s original growth law in equation (2) is a near 
identity (Razmi, 2016), as implied by equation (4), it is necessary to show that world income 
growth is a significant determinant of South Africa’s domestic income growth rate. Consider 
the empirical fit of the generalised version of the BPC growth model in equation (5). Nell 
(2003) shows that OECD growth is a significant determinant of South Africa’s income 
growth rate over the period 1981-1998, with a difference between the actual and predicted 
growth rate of only 0.12 percentage points. These results complement the empirical fit of 
Thirlwall’s original growth law in Table 2 over the SGR (1977-2003) and verify that South 
Africa’s growth rate is constrained by world income growth.  
Looking at the period 2004-2017 when South Africa’s average growth rate of 3.01% 
shows a marked improvement relative to the SGR, the difference between the actual and 
predicted growth rate in column (3) of Table 2 is 0.71 percentage points. Although 
McCombie’s (1989) test in Table 3 shows that the difference is statistically significant, the 
under-prediction is small relative to the 2.96 percentage point difference in the FGR (1960-
1976). The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest that capital inflows and movements in the 
real terms of trade may account for the under-prediction in this regime.  The growth rate of 
the real terms of trade is positive (1.91%) and the excess of import growth over export 
growth is 2.78 percentage points. 
 
5.1 The Sustainability of South Africa’s Growth Transitions 
The preceding discussion shows that Thirlwall’s growth law in equation (2) accurately 
predicts South Africa’s growth rate over the period 1977-2003. Outside this regime, the 
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growth law under predicts. The SGR (1977-2003), therefore, serves as a useful reference 
point to evaluate the sustainability of South Africa’s growth transitions outside this regime.  
Because the simple version of the growth law assumes zero growth in the real terms of 
trade over the long run, negative growth of 1.44% during 1960-1976 and positive growth of 
1.91% during 2004-2017 may partly explain why the actual and predicted growth rates are 
statistically different. However, this argument assumes that movements in the real terms of 
trade generate growth effects because the weighted price elasticities in equation (1) are of the 
right magnitude. In South Africa’s case, however, this assumption may not necessarily hold. 
Narayan and Narayan (2010) find an insignificant long-run relative price effect in South 
Africa’s export demand function over the period 1960-2005, while the magnitude of the real 
effective exchange rate elasticity of 0.26 in Rangasamy and Brick (2007) during 1990(Q1)-
2006(Q4) is relatively small and becomes insignificant in their alternative export demand 
specification. From equation (1), it can be seen that the real terms of trade effect drops out if 
it is assumed that the relative price effect in the export demand function is zero ( = 0), 
together with the fact that the estimated relative price elasticity in equation (7) is unity (ˆ  = 
1.00). The simplified equation can be written as:  
 ** ( ) ( )CE t t dtR RSA x c py

 
                                               (9) 
Equation (9) implies that the under-prediction of the BPC growth model outside the 1977-
2003 regime can be attributed to real capital inflows.  
Consider the empirical fit of equation (9) over the sub-periods 1960-1976 and 2004-2017. 
Although capital inflows played a key role during 1960-1976, the current account ratio shows 
a surplus during the first four years (1960-1963) of this regime. Since the economy 
experienced a short period of capital outflows during 1960-1963, it is not possible to 
calculate the growth rate of capital inflows for each year during the FGR regime (1960-
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1976). Instead, we focus our analysis on the period 2004-2017 when the current account 
recorded a deficit in each year, including 2003.  In this regime, the growth rate of net capital 
inflows can be calculated for each year. 
Table 4 shows that the difference between South Africa’s actual growth rate and the 
predicted growth rate of equation (9) is 0.20 percentage points over the period 2004-2017. 
Using McCombie’s (1989) procedure, the Wald test (p-value = 0.17) cannot reject the null 
that the actual growth rate is equal to the predicted growth rate of the extended model with 
capital inflows. The good fit of the extended model downplays the role of relative price 
changes6. 
 
Table 4. Fitting the BPC Growth Model with Capital Inflows, 2004-2017 
 
 
Growth 
regime 
(1) 
Actual 
average 
growth rate 
(%) 
 
*( )SAty  
(2) 
Predicted                   
average 
growth rate 
(%) 
 
**( )SAy  
 
(3) 
 
Difference:  
(1)-(2) 
 
 
(4) 
Export 
volume 
effect 
(%) 
 
ˆ[( ) ] /E tR x   
(5) 
Real capital 
flows effect 
 
(%) 
 
  ˆ[ ( )] /C t dtR c p   
 
2004 – 2017 
 
3.01 3.21 0.20 2.02 1.19 
Note: (1) The weights in columns (4) and (5) are E/R = 0.88 and C/R = 0.12, respectively; 
t
x = 3.84%; ˆ = 1.67; 
and the growth rate of real capital inflows, 
t dt
c p  (the growth of net capital inflows minus the domestic inflation 
rate, as measured by the GDP deflator), is equal to 16.52%. (2) All the growth rates exclude outlying (negative) 
growth in 2009, following the global financial crisis in 2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The significant relative price effect on income reported in Razmi (2016) is ambiguous. He finds that the log-
levels of export and import prices are significant determinants of the log-level of income in South Africa over 
the period 1950-2011. However, the price variables are included separately in the income equation. A more 
appropriate specification, consistent with the BPC growth model, would be to estimate the relative price effect 
as a log ratio rather than separate level effects. For more on this critique, see Nell (2013, pp. 126-127).  
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At the same time, however, the results do not imply that the economy can rely on an 
indefinite inflow of capital to lift the balance-of-payments constraint on demand growth (see 
Moreno-Brid, 1998; Barbosa-Filho, 2001). In this context, it is important to highlight that the 
real GDP growth rate of 3.01% during 2004-2017 is inflated by a short period of ‘super-fast’ 
growth from 2004 to 2007, when growth surged to an average annual rate of 5.06% (see Nell 
and De Mello, 2019). During the period of super-fast growth, the current account deficit ratio 
deteriorated at a rapid rate, with an excess of import growth over export growth of more than 6 
percentage points. 
A comparison of the results across the 2004-2017 and 2008-2017 regimes in Table 2 shows 
that the difference between the actual and predicted growth rate has shrunk from 0.71 to 0.49 
percentage points. The convergence of South Africa’s actual growth rate to the rate predicted by 
the simple version of the BPC model implies that the growth rate of real capital inflows is 
slowing down over time. Consistent with the prediction of the BPC growth model, the brunt of 
the adjustment has fallen on income growth to re-align import growth with export growth and 
preserve current account solvency. This is evident in a precipitous slowdown in income growth 
from an average rate of 5.01% during 2004-2007 to 2.01% over the period 2008-2017. Over the 
same sub-periods the excess of import growth over exports growth dropped from 6 percentage 
points to 1.27 percentage points. 
South Africa’s experience with capital inflows differs markedly across the 1960-1976 and 
2004-2017 regimes. FDI inflows during 1960-1976 seem to have played a prominent role in 
lifting the balance-of-payments constraint on growth over a more long-term basis (Nell and De 
Mello, 2019). Because the real terms of trade data used in this paper only start in 1960, our FGR 
sample period is restricted, as opposed to Nell and De Mello (2019) who emphasise the growth-
inducing effect of FDI over a longer period from 1952 to 1976. In contrast to the long-term 
nature of capital inflows in the post-World War II period until 1976, short-term inflows, such as 
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portfolio investment and other inflows (inclusive of foreign borrowing), appear to have 
dominated since 2004 (Rangasamy, 2014; Nell and De Mello, 2019). However, as witnessed by 
South Africa’s actual experience over the period 2004-2017, excessive reliance on short-term 
capital inflows can be highly disruptive and is not a source of sustained growth. 
To summarise, South Africa’s growth accelerations outside the BPC regime (1977-2003) 
have generally coincided with surges in investment (see Nell and De Mello, 2019) and a 
deteriorating current account deficit ratio, rather than faster export growth. The results imply 
that South Africa’s recent growth surge in the post-2003 period is unsustainable, and that the 
economy’s long-run growth rate is converging back to the rate predicted by Thirlwall’s law. The 
analysis further shows that it is uninformative to evaluate Thirlwall’s growth law across a single 
regime à la Razmi (2016). Once regime changes are controlled for, the growth law provides 
valuable information on the sustainability of South Africa’s different growth transitions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has re-evaluated some of the recent criticisms of Thirlwall’s (1979) law 
against the literature on growth transitions. The actual growth experience of most developing 
countries is characterised by multiple regimes of growth accelerations and decelerations, 
rather than sustained growth, as has been the case in most advanced countries and several 
Asian economies. It follows that an empirical test of Thirlwall’s law across a single regime is 
uninformative, because it is not possible to distinguish between sources of growth that initiate 
and sustain a growth transition. Real terms of trade movements and a faster rate of physical 
capital accumulation may initiate a growth acceleration, but because growth is not triggered 
by the variables and parameters that constitute Thirlwall’s law, the growth transition will 
eventually fizzle out. A rigorous test of Thirlwall’s law in a typical developing would 
therefore require a more detailed and in-depth analysis of turning points in an economy’s 
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growth performance, and whether growth accelerations tend to dissipate over time because 
they are initiated through factors that fall outside the domain of the simple growth rule.  
The empirical application shows that Thirlwall’s growth law under predicts South 
Africa’s actual growth rate over the period 1960-2017. The under prediction over the full 
sample period, however, is largely the result of volatile and unsustainable growth transitions 
that mask over the true long-run determinants of growth in South Africa. The split of the 
sample period into different growth regimes reveals that the balance-of-payments-constrained 
(BPC) growth rule accurately predicts South Africa’s actual growth rate over the period 
1977-2003. The analysis further shows that the close fit of the model is not the result of an 
identity, as some of the critics have argued (Blecker, 2016; Razmi, 2016), but rather because 
the BPC model accurately predicts the data generating process. The results of the generalised 
version of the BPC growth model in Nell (2003), over roughly the same period, show that 
OECD growth is a significant determinant of domestic income growth in South Africa, thus 
supporting the causal mechanism that underlies Thirlwall’s original law.  
Outside the 1977-2003 regime the South African economy has relied heavily on capital 
inflows to lift the balance-of-payments constraint on demand growth. The analysis in this 
paper during the 1960-1976 regime, together with the narrative in Nell and De Mello (2019) 
over a longer sample period, suggests that long-term capital inflows in the form of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) have played an important role in lifting the balance-of-payments 
constraint on demand growth in the post-World War II period until 1976. 
In contrast, during the 2004-2017 regime capital inflows were more volatile and short-
term in nature. The results demonstrate that the difference between the actual and predicted 
growth rate of the BPC growth model is only 0.71 percentage points during this regime, and 
that the difference is statistically insignificant when the model is augmented with capital 
inflows (assuming zero terms-of-trade effects). The results further indicate that the difference 
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between the actual and predicted growth rate of the simple version of the BPC model is 
contracting over time, which emphasises the unsustainable nature of capital inflows during 
the 2004-2017 regime. In the absence of long-term capital inflows, South Africa’s long-run 
growth rate is converging back to the rate predicted by Thirlwall’s simple growth law. 
To summarise, consistent with Razmi’s (2016) single-regime regression results, 
Thirlwall’s law is also rejected when it is considered over the full sample period for South 
Africa. However, an analysis of this nature is uninformative in the presence of multiple 
regimes. Once regime changes are controlled for, it is shown that the growth law provides 
key information on the sustainability of South Africa’s growth transitions. 
Finally, it was argued that econometric evidence of a statistically significant link between 
output growth and the level of the real exchange rate does not necessarily imply that there 
exists a long-run relationship in the true sense of the word. Panel data and time-series 
evidence across a single regime is uninformative about the sustainability of different growth 
determinants when the actual growth performance of economies is characterised by multiple 
regimes. The literature on growth transitions identifies a competitive exchange rate as a key 
initiating source of growth, but other complementary measures are required to sustain 
growth. In the specific case of South Africa, it would be advisable to follow a two-pronged 
strategy. A competitive exchange rate could help to shift resources into the tradable sector 
and raise the exports of existing manufactures from the supply side (Edwards and Alves, 
2006; Rodrik, 2008b; Razmi, 2016; Iyke, 2017). However, the relevance of Thirlwall’s law in 
South Africa suggests that growth will eventually fizzle out if it is not complemented with 
additional policy measures that improve the structural demand characteristics of export goods 
in foreign markets and/or reduce the income elasticity of demand for imports.  
  
 
 25 
REFERENCES 
Arize, A.C. and S. Nippani (2010). “Import Demand Behavior in Africa: some new 
evidence.” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 50 (3):254-263. 
Bagnai, A., A. Rieber, and T. A-D. Tran (2016). “Sub-Saharan Africa’s Growth, South-South 
Trade and the Generalised Balance-of-Payments Constraint.” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 40 (3): 797-820.  
Bai, J. and P. Perron (1998). “Estimating and Testing Linear Models with Multiple Structural 
Changes.” Econometrica, 66 (1): 47-78.  
Bai, J. and P. Perron (2003). “Computation and Analysis of Multiple Structural Change 
Models.” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 18 (1): 1-22. 
Barbosa-Filho, N.H. (2001). “The Balance-of-Payments Constraint: from balanced trade to 
sustainable debt.” Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 54(219): 381-400. 
Berg, A., J. D. Ostry, and J. Zettelmeyer (2012). “What Makes Growth Sustained?” Journal 
of Development Economics, 98 (2): 149-166.  
Blecker, R.A. (2016). “The Debate over ‘Thirlwall’s Law’: balance-of-payments-constrained 
growth reconsidered.” European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, 
13 (3): 275-290. 
Bresser-Pereira, L.C. and F. Rugitsky (2018). “Industrial Policy and Exchange Rate 
Scepticism.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 42 (3): 617-632. 
Cimoli, M., G. Porcile, and S. Rovira (2010). “Structural Change and the BOP-constraint: 
why did Latin America fail to converge?” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 34 (2): 389-411. 
de Vries, G., M. Timmer, and K. de Vries (2015). “Structural Transformation in Africa: 
Static Gains, Dynamic Losses.” Journal of Development Studies, 51 (6): 674-688. 
Diao, X., M. McMillan, and D. Rodrik (2017). “The Recent Growth Boom in Developing 
Economies: A Structural Change Perspective.” NBER Working Papers, 23132. 
Easterly, W., M. Kremer., L. Pritchett, and L.H. Summers (1993). “Good Policy or Good 
Luck? Country Growth Performance and Temporary Shocks.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 32 (3): 459-483. 
Edwards, L. (2005). “Has South Africa Liberalised its Trade?” South African Journal of 
Economics, 73 (4): 754-775.  
Edwards, L. and P. Alves (2006). South Africa’s Export Performance: determinants of export 
supply.” South African Journal of Economics, 74 (3): 473-500. 
Freund, C. and M.D. Pierola (2012). “Export Surges.” Journal of Development Economics, 
97 (2): 387-395.   
Gouvea, R.R. and G.T. Lima (2010). “Structural Change, Balance-of-Payments Constraint, 
and Economic Growth: evidence from the multisectoral Thirlwall’s Law.” Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics, 33 (1): 169-204. 
Hausmann, R., L. Pritchett, and D. Rodrik (2005). “Growth Accelerations.” Journal of 
Economic Growth, 10 (4): 303-329. 
Iyke, B.N. (2017). “Exchange rate Undervaluation and Sectoral Performance of the South 
African Economy.” Journal of Economic Studies, 44 (4): 636-649. 
 26 
Jerzmanowski, M. (2006). “Empirics of Hills, Plateaus, Mountains and Plains: a Markov-
Switching approach to growth.” Journal of Development Economics, 81 (2): 357-385. 
Jones, B.F. and B.A. Olken (2008). “The Anatomy of Start-Stop Growth.” Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 90 (3): 582-587.   
Kerekes, M. (2012). “Growth Miracles and Failures in a Markov Switching Classification 
Model of Growth.” Journal of Development Economics, 98 (2): 167-177.     
Libman, E., J.A Montecino, and A. Razmi (2019). “Sustained Investment Surges.” Oxford 
Economic Papers, forthcoming. DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpy071. 
McCombie, J.S.L. (1989). “‘Thirlwall’s Law’ and Balance of Payments Constrained Growth 
 a comment on the debate.” Applied Economics, 21 (5):611-29. 
McMillan, M., D. Rodrik, and Í. Verduzco-Gallo (2014). “Globalization, Structural Change, 
and Productivity Growth, with and update on Africa.” World Development, 63 (C): 11-32. 
Missio, F., R.A. Araujo, and F.G. Jayme (2017). “Endogenous Elasticities and the impact of 
the Real Exchange Rate on Structural Economic Dynamics.” Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics, 42 (C): 67-75. 
Moreno-Brid, J.C. (1998). “On Capital Flows and the Balance-of-Payments-Constrained 
Growth Model.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 21(2): 283-298. 
Narayan, S. and P.K. Narayan (2010). “Estimating Import and Export Demand Elasticities for 
Mauritius and South Africa.” Australian Economic Papers, 48 (3): 241-252.  
Nell, K.S. (2003). “A ‘Generalised’ Version of the Balance-of-Payments Growth Model: an 
application to neighbouring regions.” International Review of Applied Economics, 17 (3): 
249-267. 
Nell, K.S. (2013). “An Alternative Explanation of India’s Growth Transition: a demand-side 
hypothesis.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 37 (1): 113-141.  
Nell, K.S. and M.M. De Mello (2019). “The Interdependence between the Saving Rate and 
Technology across regimes: evidence from South Africa.” Empirical Economics, 56 (1): 269-
300.  
Perraton, J. (2003). “Balance of Payments Constrained Growth and Developing Countries: an 
examination of Thirlwall’s hypothesis.” International Review of Applied Economics, 17 (1): 
1-22.    
Pesaran, M.H. and B. Pesaran (1997). Working with Microfit 4.0: Interactive Econometric 
Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Pesaran, M.H., Y. Shin, and R.J. Smith (2001). “Bounds Testing Approaches to Analysis of 
Level Relationships.” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 16 (3): 289-326. 
Pritchett, L. (2000). “Understanding Patterns of Economic Growth: Searching for Hills 
among Plateaus, Mountains, and Plains.” World Bank Economic Review, 14 (2): 221-250. 
Rangasamy, L. (2014). “Capital Flows: The South African Experience.” South African 
Journal of Economics, 82 (4): 551-566.  
Rangasamy, L. and K. Brick (2007). “The Implications of OECD Growth for South African 
Exports.” South African Journal of Economics, 75 (4): 644-658.   
Rapetti, M. (2013). “Macroeconomic Policy Coordination in a Competitive Real Exchange 
Rate Strategy for Development.” Journal of Globalization and Development, 3 (2): 1-31.  
 27 
Rapetti, M., P. Skott and A. Razmi (2012). “The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth: 
are developing countries different?” International Review of Applied Economics, 26 (6): 735-
753.   
Razmi, A. (2016). “Correctly Analysing the Balance-of-Payments Constraint on Growth.” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 40 (6): 1581-1608. 
Razmi, A., M. Rapetti, and P. Skott (2012). “The Real Exchange Rate and Economic 
Development.” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 23 (2): 151-169. 
Rodrik, D. (2005). “Growth Strategies.” In Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf (eds.), 
Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier: North-Holland, pp. 967-1014. 
Rodrik, D. (2006). “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A 
Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of 
Reform.” Journal of Economic Literature, 44 (4): 973-987. 
Rodrik, D. (2008a). “The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth.” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 39 (2): 365-439.   
Rodrik, D. (2008b). “Understanding South Africa’s Economic Puzzles.” The Economics of 
Transition, 16(4): 769-797.   
Rodrik, D. (2018). “An African Growth Miracle?” Journal of African Economies 27 (1): 10-
27.  
Schwarz, G.  (1978). “Estimating the Dimensions of a Model.” Annals of Statistics, 6 (2): 
461-464. 
Tharnpanich, N. and J.S.L. McCombie (2013). “Balance-of-Payments Constrained Growth, 
Structural Change, and the Thai Economy.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 35 (4): 
569-598.  
Thirlwall, A.P. (1979). “The Balance of Payments Constraint as an Explanation of 
International Growth Rate Differences.” Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 32 
(128): 45-53.  
Thirlwall, A.P. (2011). “Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Models: history and 
overview.” PSL Quarterly Review, 64 (259): 307-351.  
Thirlwall, A.P. and M.N Hussain (1982). “The Balance of Payments Constraint, Capital 
Flows and Growth Rate differences between Developing Countries.” Oxford Economic 
Papers, 34 (3): 498-510. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
APPENDIX A, Table A1 – VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCE 
           
Variable Description Source/Calculation 
ln( )tY  
Natural logarithm of real GDP 
(constant 2010 prices). 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) 
   
SA
ty  Domestic income growth rate. 1ln( ) ln( )t tY Y   
ln( )tMRP  
The price of imports relative 
to the price of exports in 
domestic currency, excluding 
gold. 
SARB 
ln( )tM  
Natural logarithm of real 
imports of goods and services 
(constant 2010 prices). 
SARB 
tm  Growth rate of real imports. 1ln( ) ln( )t tM M   
ln( )tX  
Natural logarithm of real 
exports of goods and services 
(constant 2010 prices). 
SARB 
tx  Growth rate of real exports. 1ln( ) ln( )t tX X   
t dtc p  
Growth rate of real capital 
inflows = growth of total net 
capital inflows ( tc ), measured 
by the current account deficit, 
minus the domestic inflation 
rate ( dtp ), measured by the 
GDP deflator.  
SARB 
Calculated as log differences. 
Current account 
ratio  
Current account as a 
percentage of GDP. A 
negative () ratio denotes a 
deficit. 
SARB 
Real terms of 
trade growth rate  
The price of exports relative 
to the price of imports in 
domestic currency, excluding 
gold. 
SARB 
Calculated as log differences. 
Dummy:  
tD  
Equals 1 in 1997 and 1998; 
zero otherwise. 
Captures a sharp rise in import demand due to a 
surge in domestic inflation.  
Dummy: 
tDcom  
Equals 1 in 1966 and 1 
during 1991-1992; zero 
otherwise. 
A combined dummy with equal magnitudes and 
opposite signs. The negative effect on import 
demand in 1966 is a pure outlying observation, 
whereas the positive effect during 1991-1992 
captures the effect of trade liberalisation measures 
(see Edwards, 2005). 
 
Note: The data cover the period 1960-2017.  
